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“Anchoring Effects in the HRS: Experimental and Nonexperimental Evidence”
The Health and Retirement Study (HRS) and a number of other major household surveys use unfolding
brackets to reduce item nonresponse. However, the initial entry point into a bracketing sequence is likely
to act as an anchor or point of reference to the respondent: The distribution of responses among those
bracketed would be influenced by the entry point. For example, when the initial entry point is high the
distribution will be shifted to the right, leading one to believe that holdings of the particular asset are
greater than they truly are. This paper has two goals. The first is to analyze some experimental data on
housing value from HRS wave 3 for anchoring effects. The second is to compare the distributions of
assets in HRS waves 1 and 2 for evidence about any anchoring effects that may have been caused by
changes in the entry points between the waves. Both the experimental data on housing values and the
nonexperimental data from HRS waves 1 and 2 on assets show anchoring effects. The conclusion is that
to estimate accurately wealth change in panel data sets, we need a method of correcting for anchoring
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Item nonresponse in a survey is the failure of a respondent to answer a question
fully. In household surveys, item nonresponse to questions about income, and particularly
assets can be rather high: for example in the 1991 Survey of Income and Program
Participation 47% of married respondents who owned common stock did not give a value
for their stock holdings, and 66% of single respondents did not give a value (Hoynes,
Hurd and Chand, forthcoming). Because of the highly skewed distribution of many assets,
imputation for missing values is not very satisfactory: covariates can explain a rather small
fraction of variance, which means that, the true stock holdings of a household are likely to
be far from the imputed value.’
The Health and Retirement Study (HRS) and the Asset and Health Dynamics
Study (AHEAD), and a number of other major household surveys use bracketing to
reduce the harm to data quality from item nonresponse. In a typical bracketing sequence, a
respondent will be asked about ownership of an asset such as common stocks. At this
stage the response rate is very high, for example 98.1% in the AHEAD baseline.
However, when owners of stocks are asked to give the value of their holdings, the
response rate falls substantially: in AHEAD among owners of stocks just 54% gave a
value to their stock holdings, or, in terms of nonresponse, 46% either refused to answer
(RF) or did not know the value (DK). In HRS and AHEAD the nonrespondents were
then asked a series of bracketing questions, which because these surveys are mainly
administered over the telephone, are in the form of “unfolding” bracketing questions. For
example, in wave 1 of HRS a respondent who answered RF or DK to the question about
stock value was asked “Would it amount to $25,000 or more?” If “yes,” “Would it
amount to $100,000 or more?” and so forth until the value of the asset was placed in one
of the brackets O-$4,999, $5,000-$24,999, $25,000-99,999, $lOO,OOO-$499,999  or
$500,000 or more. Of course, knowing the bracket in which the value lies is not as good
as knowing the actual value, but knowledge of the bracket can substantially improve the
’ While stochastic imputation can preserve the distribution of responses, it would not improve imputation
for a particular household.accuracy of imputation. For example, using the bracket information only for imputation
typically yields an R* of about 0.80 in logs whereas covariates alone would yield an R* of
about 0.20. Therefore, even a simply hot-deck imputation within brackets would give
much better individual imputations than could be obtained without the brackets. The
imputation can be further improved by using covariates in addition as in “nearest
neighbor” imputation (Little, Sande and Scheuren, 1988; Hoynes, Hurd and Chand,
forthcoming).
Despite the utility of using unfolding brackets, however, the initial entry point into
the bracketing sequence is likely to act as an anchor or point of reference to the
respondent, and work by psychologists suggests that the distribution of responses among
those bracketed would be influenced by the entry point.*  When the initial entry point is
high the distribution will be shifted to the right, leading one to believe that holdings of the
particular asset are greater than they truly are. A seemingly plausible method of
investigating anchoring effects based on the data from waves 1 of HRS and AHEAD
would be to compare for each asset the distribution of responses among those that gave a
continuous response (actual value) with the distribution among those that were bracketed.
Evidence for anchoring effects would be that the distribution of the bracketed responses is
systematically shifted to the right when the entry point is high relative the distribution of
the continuous responses. For example, anchoring would predict that when the entry
point is greater than the median of the continuous responses, the median of the bracketed
responses will be greater than the median of the continuous responses. However, there is
good evidence that self-selection into the bracketing sequence affects the estimated
distribution: in particular respondents that answered RF have different characteristics than
the continuous respondents, and they seem truly to have higher asset holdings (Smith,
1995). Thus the effects of anchoring and the effects of selection are confounded.
Between wave 1 and wave 2 of HRS many of the brackets were changed through a
procedure called “bracket optimization.” The aim of the procedure is to choose the best
bracket boundary points where “best” is defined by the objective of maximizing a fitted
2 See Tversky and Kahneman (1974),  Kruglanski  and Freund (1982),  Jacowitz and Kahneman (1993,
Strack and Mussweiler (1997),  and Wilson, et al. (1996).
2sum of squares in imputation. Because of the highly skewed distributions of many assets
the procedure often called for increasing the top boundary point so that few observations
would be in the open interval ($500,000 or over in the case of stocks in wave l), and in
turn changing the other boundary points. In that one of the bracket boundary points
serves as the entry point into the bracketing sequence, this meant in a number of cases the
entry point was also changed. Furthermore, true holdings of many assets changed, mostly
increasing, because of advances in capital markets, saving by households, and increased
ownership rates. This by itself changed the relationship between the anchors and the
distributions of the assets, which would be expected to cause the magnitudes of anchoring
effects to change even had the entry points remained constant.
To provide data with which to study the effects of anchoring in surveys of
economic data, two experiments were designed and conducted in the HRS and AHEAD
studies. In AHEAD wave 2 subjects were queried about the value of savings accounts
and the value of monthly consumption. They were randomly assigned to different entry
pvints in a bracketing sequence with the objective of finding the change in the distribution
of responses as the entry point varied. The data show a substantial amount of anchoring:
the median of estimated monthly consumption varied from about $860 to $1490 as the
entry point varied from $500 to $5000. There was somewhat smaller variation in savings
account balances probably reflecting less uncertainty among respondents (Hurd, ef al.
forthcoming).
HRS wave 3 contained some randomized experiments about housing value, about
regular checking accounts and about the circumference of the earth with the same
objectives. Because of the random assignment, there should be no systematic effects of
self-selection.
This paper has two goals. The first is to analyze the experimental data on housing
value from HRS wave 3 for anchoring effects . Because some respondents are known a
priori to have greater knowledge of housing value than others, one can find how
anchoring varies with the level of uncertainty. The second goal is to compare the
distributions of assets in HRS waves 1 and 2 for evidence about the effects of the changes
in the entry points between the waves.
32. Anchoring experiments in HRS wave 3
The HRS is biennial panel. At baseline in 1992 it surveyed 12,654 community-
dwelling persons in the U.S. representing the cohorts of 1931-1941 and their spouses. Its
main substantive domains are labor market behavior, health and economic status. It
placed particular emphasis on a comp,lete  inventory of income and assets and their careful
measurement.
To encourage innovation the HRS has added experimental modules at the end of
each wave of the main survey. The experimental modules have the aim of administering
2-3 minutes of speculative, experimental or one-shot material that, if successful, could be
put on the main survey. They are asked at end of interview, and the respondents are given
the specific opportunity to refuse. However, the refusal rate to the modules is low. The
anchoring experiments in HRS wave 3 were in the experimental modules.
Wave 3 was administered in 1996, when the age-eligible respondents would have
been about 55-65. There were three categories of questions on the experimental modules
about anchoring: the value of owner occupied housing, value of regular checking
accounts and the circumference of the earth. Respondents were not allowed to give a
continuous answer but were asked unfolding bracket questions. I will use data here from
nine modules on 7387 individuals about housing value.
Following an initial question that ascertained ownership, owners were asked about
housing value in one of three formats:
“Would it be more than $$$?”
“Would it be $$$ or more?”
“Would it be less than $$$ or more than $$$?”
where $$$ was one of $50k, $lOOk, $150k. The purpose of the variation in question
format was to investigate whether the unbalanced formats (the first two) cause the
distribution of responses to be shifted to the right (higher values). Apparently
4psychological experiments find that people tend to answer “yes” to questions somewhat
more often than “no,” even when through randomization there should be no difference in
the frequencies. Such an effect would, for these formats, lead to greater frequencies in the
higher brackets compared with the balanced format and, therefore, higher imputed housing
values.
The experimental design called for interactions among all the treatments, so that
there were nine treatments. Individuals were assigned at random to one of the treatments.
The importance of assignment by individual rather than by household is that the question
about housing value had already been answered in the main survey by the financial
respondent.’ Because anchoring effects are thought to increase with the uncertainty of
the respondent, we would expect little if any anchoring effects among financial
respondents regardless of the accuracy of their knowledge of housing values: they simply
had to remember the answer they gave a short time earlier in the survey and accurately
bracket themselves. We would expect moderate amounts among nonfinancial respondents
because most people probably have a good, but not certain, idea of housing value.
Figure 1 shows the distribution of responses among financial respondents when the
question format was “Would it be more than $$$?” The figure shows the percentage
distribution at the points $50k (first panel), $lOOk (second panel), and $150k (third panel)
as a function of the entry point (anchor). For example, when the anchor was $50k, about
19% of the financial respondents answered “no” to the question “Would it be more than
SS?” and therefore were placed in the interval less than or equal to $50k. Among those
given the initial entry point of $lOOk, about 58% answered “no” (second panel) and about
17% of the total answered “no” when given the follow-up question “Would it be more
than $50k?” (first panel). Evidence of anchoring would be that the distribution shifts to
the right as the anchor increases, or in the figure the percentage at any point decreases as
the anchor increases. For example, the percentage having $ IOOk or less should decrease
as the entry point increases from $50k to $lOOk to $150k. The right-most panel has that
pattern, but the other two panels do not. Thus, Figure 1 has no overall evidence that the
’ The financial respondent is the spouse that is judged by the respondents themselves to be most
knowledgeable about the financial situation of the household.
5financial respondents were anchored. The results are about the same for the format
“Would it be $$$ or more?” so I do not show them.
Figure 2 shows the distributions when the format is “Would it be less than $$$ or
more than $$$?” The vertical segments come from voluntary answers. For example, a
respondent when given the initial entry of $lOOk might volunteer that the value is about
$lOOk. Thus there is a probability mass at $lOOk which causes the jump. This is a
valuable feature of the balanced question: in imputation such respondents could be
imputed a value of $lOOk rather than a random draw from the interval $50k to $lOOk or
from $lOOk to $150k. The figure does not show any consistent anchoring effect: the
distribution for the entry point of $lOOk is shifted to the left of the distributions for $50k
and $150k, which are about the same. 1 conclude that there is no consistent evidence for
anchoring among financial respondents. As previously mentioned, this would be expected.
Figure 3 shows the distributions for nonfinancial respondents for the unbalanced
question format, “Would it be more than $$$?” and Figure 4 the distributions for the
unbalanced format, “Would it be $$$ or more?” Particularly in Figure 4 there is
considerable evidence for an anchoring effect: when the entry was $50k about 50% said
their housing value was less than $lOOk; when the entry was $150k only about 38% said
it was less than $lOOk. The effect seems to be greatest when the anchor is increased from
$1 OOk to $150k rather than from $50k to $lOOk.
Figure 5 has the distributions for the balanced format among nonfinancial
respondents. When the entry was $50k or $lOOk the distributions were about the same
with an estimated median of about $90k. However, the distribution was shifted
substantially to the right when the entry was $150k, and the estimated median increased to
about $lOOk, an increase of 11 %.4
A way to summarize the nine treatments is by descriptive regression. The left-
hand variable in the regression is the estimated probability that housing value is less than x,
or that housing value is less than or equal to X, where x = $50k, $lOOk, $150k. The right
hand variables are indicator variables for the probabilities, indicator variables for question
’ The estimates of the medians are based on linear interpolation of the logs
6format, and indicator variables for the initial anchor interacted with an indicator variable
for financial respondent.5
Table 1 has the results of the regression. Negative coefficients mean that relative
to the reference group, the probability that housing value is less than or less than or equal
to x is lower. That is , the distribution is shifted to the right toward higher values. The
table shows that, indeed, question format has an effect on the distributions of responses,
and the effect is what would be predicted: when the format is unbalanced there is a
reduction in the fraction that are bracketed below any of the points $50k, $lOOk or $150k,
or said differently, a greater fraction end up in the higher brackets.
The financial respondent has a somewhat higher probability of bracketing into the
lower brackets as indicated by comparing the coefficients on financial respondent with the
coefficients on nonfinancial respondent, holding constant the anchor point. For example,
the financial respondent has about a 0.04 higher probability of being bracketed below
$50k, $lOOk or $150k when the initial entry point is $lOOk compared with the
nonfinancial respondent. The financial respondent would be imputed with lower housing
values than the nonfinancial respondent. This happens because all nonfinancial
respondents are married whereas some financial respondents are single. Because couples
have higher housing value than singles, on average nonfinancial respondents have higher
housing values than financial respondents.6
Anchoring effects are indicated by increasingly negative coefficients as the anchor
point increases. It is evident that for financial respondents there are no anchoring effects.
For nonfinancial respondents, however, the probability decreases by 0.05 when the anchor
increases from $50k to $150k, almost completely due to change when the entry increases
from $1 OOk to $150k. To show the importance of this effect, Figure 6 has fitted
distributions for three cases: an average financial respondent (averaged over the three
anchor points), a nonfinancial respondent with anchor of $lOOk and a nonfinancial
respondent with anchor of $150k. As before the vertical segments result from voluntary
responses to the balanced questions. The estimated median among the financial
’ The probability variables are indicators that housing value is < $5Ok, 5 $5Ok, < $1 OOk, I $1 OOk, <
$150k, and 5 $150k.
’ Thanks to Martha Hill for pointing this out to me.
7respondents is about $87k, which is very close to the “true” median from the main survey
of $90k. Among nonfinancial respondents the medians are about $92k and $lOOk. Thus
increasing the anchor by 50% (from $lOOk to $150k) increased the median among
nonfinancial respondents by about 8.7% which is an elasticity of 17.4%.
One conclusion from this experiment is that question format influences the
distribution of responses: the unbalanced format led to higher frequencies of affirmative
responses, and, in the context of this experiment, higher implicit housing values. A second
conclusion is that the magnitude of anchoring varies with the amount of uncertainty.
Financial respondents are likely to have better knowledge of housing value than
nonfinancial respondents; but more importantly financial respondents earlier in the survey
had given their estimate of housing value, which apparently resolved any uncertainty about
their estimates. Indeed, financial respondents were not anchored whereas nonfinancial
respondents were moderately anchored.
3.. Asset change between waves 1 and 2
Between waves 1 and 2 of HRS there were a number of changes that would affect
measured asset holdings. True holdings of many assets changed, mostly increasing,
because of advances in capital markets, saving by households, and increased ownership
rates. There may have been an increase in the level of uncertainty because of the rapid
change in the prices of assets. The bracket optimization program changed many of the
brackets and the entry points, so that any anchoring effects would have changed. There
may have been a change in the importance of self-selection. The data are not adequate to
investigate all of these changes. 1 will assume for the moment that the relative magnitude
of self-selection  did not change between the waves; however, this assumption is not really
necessary to find at least qualitatively if there were anchoring effects induced by the
changes in the entry points.
8Table 2 shows the rate of asset ownership in each wave, and among owners the
distribution of types of answers about the value of the asset.7 For example, 27.1% of
households owned stocks in wave 1. Among the owners, 73.1% gave a continuous
response (actual number) to the query about value, 20.9% were bracketed and 6% did not
give a continuous answer and would not answer the bracketing questions. The number
bracketed was 459.
Ownership rates were rather stable, with modest increases in stocks and IRAs and
modest declines in certificates of deposit and treasury bills. The rate of continuous
responses declined for about half of the asset categories. Some of this decline is due to
the use of the range card in wave 1: the interview in wave 1 was face-to-face which
allowed some respondents who refused to give a continuous amount to give a bracket
interval from a range card. The bracket intervals in the range card were different from the
bracket intervals in the unfolding brackets. Furthermore, there is no comparable entry
point which would act as an anchor, so that a meaningful comparison with wave 2
bracketed responses cannot be made.’ For this reason I treated range card respondents in
wave 1 as continuous responses.’ The percentage refusing to give a bracket generally
declined between the waves, possible reflecting increased confidence among respondents
in the survey.
Table 3 shows the bracket boundaries and the entry points (shaded) for the eight
asset categories.” In a number of cases the upper boundary was increased so that fewer
households would fall in the open-ended bracket. The initial entry point changed
substantially for a number of assets including checking and saving, and certificates of
deposit and treasury bills.
Separately by asset category, by wave and by bracket, the bracketed observations
were imputed by hot-deck. That is, an asset value was assigned to a bracketed respondent
’ These rates are calculated as cross-sectional rates; thus, the sample composition differs in the two
waves.
8 The range card will, nonetheless act as an anchor because respondents tend to give answers from the
middle of the categories. Thus the distribution of responses will differ as the range and boundaries of the
brackets in the range card are varied.
” According to Smith (1995) the percentage of respondents that used the range card varied from 0.4
(bonds) to 4.0 (checking).
I” Ilousing  value is not analyzed because it was not bracketed in wave 1,
9by making a random drawing from the pool of continuous reporters in the same bracket
interval. On average the difference between the distributions of assets of the continuous
reporters and the bracketed reporters is only due to the frequency of responses in each
bracket. Table 4 has the median and mean in each wave for the eight asset categories.
In wave 1 the median value of common stocks among continuous reporters was
$18 thousand, and the entry point into the bracketing sequence was $25k. If there were
no selection, anchoring theory would suggest that the median among the bracketers would
be greater than the median among continuous reporters because the anchor was greater
than the median. This is found in the table. By wave 2, median stock holdings among
continuous reporters grew to $26k, but the entry point remained at $25k. In that the
anchor was approximately the same as the median, anchoring theory would suggest that
the median among bracketers would not be affected by the anchor, and, therefore, it
would be the same as the median among continuous reporters. This is also what the table
shows. As a consequence the median among continuous reporters grew by 44% and
among bracketers it grew by 25%. The situation is similar for the mean.
The distribution of checking and savings accounts was very stable across waves as
measured by the continuous reports: both the median and mean were unchanged at $5k
and $16k respectively. However, the entry point increased from $5 thousand to $50
thousand: the median of the bracketers doubled and the mean increased by 43%,
suggesting substantial anchoring effects. The situation is similar for certificates of deposit
and treasure bills.
The anchor point for bonds decreased between the waves, and although the
continuous median and mean increased substantially, the bracketed median and mean were
practically unchanged. The results for common stocks shoed that a shift in the
distribution with a constant anchor would cause the bracketed median to increase, but by
less than for continuous reporters. With bonds the anchor decreased substantially,
apparently causing the net effect to be small.
For these four categories of assets the pattern is the same: if the entry point
increased more that the increase in the median among continuous reporters both the
median and the mean among the bracketers increased more than among the continuous
10reporters; if it increased by less the median and mean increased by less. For holdings of
IRAs, real estate, business and transportation there are some violations of this pattern.
For example, mean IRA holdings increased by 22% among continuous reporters, but by
33% among bracketers even though the anchor remained constant. There is a similar
violation of the pattern for mean real estate value, and for business value.
There is no suggestion of an anchoring effect for transportation holdings, possibly
reflecting greater knowledge among respondents about the value of their automobiles.
Figures 7 and 8 summarize these results. Each shows the percentage change in the
bracketed amount minus the percentage change in the continuous amount as a function of
the percentage change in the anchor. For example, the point (400, 100) in Figure 7
represents the median of CDs and T-bills: the anchor increased by 400% , the median
among bracketers increased by 100% and the median among continuous reporters
increased by 0%. If the effect of self-selection remains the same between the waves the
difference in the change should reflect a change in the anchor.” The figures generally
show an increase in the difference as the increase in the anchor is greater. However, the
effect does not appear to be linear: very large increases in the anchor seem to have little
additional effect. This is in agreement with findings by Hurd, et al. (forthcoming) where
very large anchors in the elicitation of savings accounts had less effect than large anchors.
The implication is that an anchor must have some plausibility to have an effect.
The figures also have a fitted line from the regression of the difference in the
change on the change in the anchor. The interpretation of the slope is the elasticity of the
bracketed median or mean with respect to the anchor. Although the regression should
only be considered to be data descriptive because the anchoring effects are likely to vary
by asset type, the overall finding is within the general range that comes out of the
experiments on AHEAD wave 2, and it is close to the elasticity of responses about
housing value among nonfinancial respondents reported earlier. Furthermore, the
regression shows a systematic relationship between the change in the anchor and the
differential change in the medians and means that cannot be explained by a change in self-
” The effect of selection is not likely to remain the same for both the median and mean, as one would
expect that changes in the shape of the distribution would cause self-selection to have differential effects
on the median and mean.
11selection between the waves: any such change in self-selection would affect the
differential change, but there is not reason it should be associated with the change in the
anchor. That is, change in self-selection would decrease the explanatory power of the
anchor change by causing unexplained variation in the left-hand variable, but not the
magnitude of the effect.
4. Conclusion.
Both the experimental data on housing values and the nonexperimental data on
eight asset categories show anchoring effects. As indicated in the housing experiment, the
effect seems to vary with the uncertainty of the respondent. If this result is confirmed by
further analysis, it opens the way for direct measures of population uncertainty about
measured quantities through anchoring experiments.
The anchoring effect apparently varies with the relationship between the anchor
and the true distribution. In that both the distribution of an asset and the uncertainty about
the value of the asset change over time, it is unlikely that the anchoring effect would be
constant over time even were the anchor to remain constant. For example, the entry
points for stocks and for IRAs were unchanged from wave 1 to wave 2; yet the medians
among the continuous reporters increased by 44% and 40% respectively while the medians
among the bracketers increased by 25% and 20%. Under this interpretation the anchoring
effect biased downward measured change in the values of these assets. However, these
quantitative assessments for each separate asset rely on the assumption that the effects of
self-selection remained constant, which is not likely to be the case for all measures of asset
change. The only reliable method of separating out change in self-selection from change
in anchoring is to have random entry into the bracketing sequence.
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I I, , , ITable 1
Effects of question format, respondent type and entry point on the distribution of housing value
(probability-level indicators) (see Figure 6)
Question format
Greater or less --
Greater or equal -0.06
Greater -0.02
Respondent type and entry point
Not financial R and 50k
Not financial R and 1OOk
Not financial R and 150k
Financial R and 50k
Financial R and 1OOk








Source: Author’s calculations based on HRS wave 3. Note: Positive numbers indicate leftward shift in distributionTable 2






















Yo Owners not bracketed continuous bracketed total number
bracketed
27.1 6.0 73.1 20.9 100.0 459
30.2 5.0 68.2 26.8 100.0 608
78.9 5.1 79.1 15.8 100.0 1003
79.4 4.2 80.3 15.5 100.0 923
25.9 6.6 78.1 15.3 100.0 320
22.0 7.1 75.2 17.7 100.0 292
6.0 9.6 78.4 12.0 100.0 59
5.3 9.9 70.9 19.2 100.0 76
37.9 5.1 79.1 15.8 100.0 486
40.9 3.5 77.1 19.4
24.3 3.5 80.3 16.2
25.2 2.2 79.3 18.5








wave 2 16.6 4.3 63.6 32.1 100.0 398
Transportation
wave 1 100.0 1.8 89.8 8.4 100.0 683
wave 2 99.6 0.8 91.2 8.0 100.0 604
Source: Author’s calculations based on HRS waves 1 and 2. Counts and percentages are unweighted.Table 3










Note: Initial entry points shadedTable 4



















Continuous Bracketed Continuous Bracketed
18 20 59 73
26 25 66 74
5 5 16 21
5 10 16 30
8 10 27 45
8 20 24 64
wave 1 25 12 20 48 73












25 20 25 45 45
25 28 30 55 60
50 45 75 149 219
125 50 90 98 229
50 25 95 168 294
100 55 75 112 197
10 7 10 13 22
wave 2 25 8
Source: Author’s calculations based on HRS 1 and HRS 2
10 12 18